

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-12 ADP-00 OMB-01 OIC-04 EURE-00 TRSE-00

CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 DODE-00 H-02

NSC-10 SS-15 ACDA-19 INRE-00 /143 W  
----- 040265

P 111504 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4420

USMISSION BERLIN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 05304

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, WB, GE, GW, UR, UN

SUBJECT: BKC/ L ON EXTENSION OF UN CHARTER TO WEST  
BERLIN

REF: A) STATE 63527; B) BONN 5053; C) BERLIN 622

1. SUMMARY: AT BONN GROUP MEETING ON APRIL 10, UK  
AND FRENCH REPS REPORTED AGREEMENT BY THEIR AUTHORITIES  
FOR ISSUANCE OF BKC/ L, AND AGREED ALLIED MISSIONS IN  
BERLIN SHOULD CONSULT WITH VIEW TO ISSUING IT ON  
PRIORITY BASIS. THERE WAS ALSO AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION  
OF THE QUESTION OF INFORMING THE SOVIETS OF THE  
EXISTENCE OF THE DOCUMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER HEARING THAT ALL THREE POWERS AGREED TO  
PROMPT ISSUANCE, THE FONOFF REP ( BRAEUTIGAM) REPEATED  
THE FRG REQUEST THAT THIS STEP BE COMPLETED AS QUICKLY  
AS POSSIBLE. ALLIED REPS AGREED TO REQUEST THE BERLIN  
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MISSIONS TO ISSUE THE BKC/ L BY THE END OF THIS WEEK. BRAEUTIGAM CONFIRMED THE FRG VIEW ( REF B) THAT THE BKC/ L SHOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED, BUT SAID HE WOULD LIKE CONFIRMATION FROM THE THREE POWERS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULD USE THE TEXT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE BUNDESTAG. THE US AND FRENCH REPS SAID THEY SAW NO REASON WHY THE TEXT ITSELF COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO DEPUTIES IF THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THIS NECESSARY. THE UK REP ( CROMARTIE) THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER JUST TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TEXT WITHOUT ACTUALLY SHOWING IT TO MEMBERS OF THE BUNDESTAG.

3. CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF INFORMING THE SOVIETS OF THE ALLIED ACTION, BRAEUTIGAM SAID THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT WHETHER ANY CONSULTATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT ALL. RECALLING THAT THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN HAD BECOME A TOPIC OF SOME INTERNAL POLITICAL IMPORTANCE, BRAEUTIGAM WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE PROBLEMS. IN HIS VIEW, THE SOVIETS WOULD IN ANY CASE PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN, POSSIBLY IN SECURITY COUNCIL. AT THIS STAGE, HE SAID THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE BETTER TO CONSIDER CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR MEETING ANY DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY THE SOVIETS RATHER THAN OFFERING THEM ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CAUSE TROUBLE.

4. THE FRENCH REP ( PLAISANT) ARGUED THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES COULD BE HEADED OFF IF THE ALLIES EXPLAINED TO THE SOVIETS THE PROCEDURES THEY HAD DEVISED FOR REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN AT SOME TIME DURING THE UN ENTRY PROCESS. WHILE AGREEING THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT BE INFORMED TOO EARLY, PLAISANT SUGGESTED THAT AN OCCASION COULD BE FOUND AROUND THE TIME THAT THE FRG UN APPLICATION AND THE SCHEEL LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WERE BEING SENT TO INFORM THE SOVIETS, AS A MATTER OF COURTESY, AS TO WHAT WAS TRANSPIRING. THIS COULD BE ON THE SAME DAY AS THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS BEING SENT. SINCE A DAY OR TWO

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WOULD PROBABLY PASS BEFORE THE SOVIETS RECEIVED THE

LETTER AS AN OFFICIAL UN DOCUMENT, SHOWING IT TO THEM  
ON THE DAY IT WAS SENT WOULD GIVE THEM A SHORT BUT  
SUFFICIENT ADVANCE NOTICE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON.  
PLAISANT REITERATED THE FRENCH VIEW THAT THE THREE  
POWERS AND THE FRG SHOULD NOT SPRING ANY UNPLEASANT  
SURPRISES ON THE SOVIETS DURING THE UN ENTRY PROCESS.

5. THE US REP NOTED THE DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY VIEW  
( REF A) THAT INFORMAL COORDINATION WITH THE SOVIETS  
OF DOCUMENTATION AND UN ENTRY SCENARIO WOULD PROBABLY  
HAVE TO TAKE PLACE ANYWAY. HE THOUGHT THAT AN OCCASION  
COULD BE FOUND EITHER IN BERLIN OR IN NEW YORK TO  
DISCUSS THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF UN ENTRY. THE PROCEDURES

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4421  
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FOR INCLUSION OF WEST BERLIN COULD ALSO BE RAISED  
INFORMALLY AT THAT TIME. THE UK REP ( CROMARTIE) THOUGHT

THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO MEET IN NEW YORK. THIS WOULD MAKE THE DISCUSSION APPEAR TO BE MORE OF A ROUTINE MATTER, WHEREAS THE SOVIETS MIGHT BECOME SUSPICIOUS IF WE CONVENED A MEETING OF POLADS IN BERLIN. PLAISANT AGREED, SAYING THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR MORE THAN A GENERAL RUN- THROUGH OF PROCEDURES WITH THE SOVIETS AND THAT THIS COULD BE DONE BETTER IN NEW YORK. PLAISANT CAUTIONED AGAINST RAISING THE TEXT OF THE FOUR POWER LETTERS WITH THE SOVIETS. AS FAR AS THE FRENCH SIDE WAS CONCERNED, THE FINAL TEXT HAD BEEN AGREED IN BERLIN BY THE FOUR AMBASSADORS LAST NOVEMBER. TO RAISE THE SUBJECT AGAIN, MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO REOPEN SUBSTANTIVE POINTS IN THE TEXT.

6. ALLIED AND FONOFF REPS AGREED THAT FURTHER STUDY  
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WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER, WHERE AND/ OR HOW TO RAISE THE BERLIN REPRESENTATION ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS. THEY DECIDED THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO REPORT THE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES TO AUTHORITIES, WITH A REQUEST FOR COMMENTS WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED AT A LATER MEETING. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT BE CONSULTED TOO EARLY AND THAT IF ANY CONSULTATION WERE TO BE CONSIDERED, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY FITTED INTO THE ENTIRE UN ENTRY SCENARIO ( SEE SEPTTEL).

7. EMBASSY COMMENT: AS REPORTED BY THE EMBASSY AND USBER, THE QUESTION OF BERLIN'S REPRESENTATION IN THE UN HAS BECOME A MATTER OF POLITICAL INTEREST IN THE FRG. WE CAN, THEREFORE, UNDERSTAND THE CONSIDERATIONS MOTIVATING THE FRG TO RECONSIDER THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF BERLIN WITH THE SOVIETS AT ALL. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT PRIOR CONTACT WOULD NOT BE HARMFUL IF IT WERE DONE AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT AND IF IT WERE MADE TO SEEM AS ROUTINE AS POSSIBLE BY INCLUDING IT INFORMALLY IN A BROADER DISCUSSION OF UN- RELATED MATTERS WITH THE SOVIETS. THE BEST POSSIBLE TIME, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD PROBABLY BE DURING A DISCUSSION OF " PROCEDURAL" ASPECTS OF THE UN ENTRY PROCESS WITH SOVIET REPS IN NEW YORK AT ABOUT THE TIME THE FRG AND GDR APPLICATIONS ARE SUBMITTED.

8. GIVEN FRG SENSITIVITIES, WE SERIOUSLY QUESTION WHETHER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE TO ATTACH A COPY OF THE BKC/ L TO THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS PROPOSED BY USBER ( REF C). WE ALSO WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO INCLUDE AN

ALLIED ORDER FROM BERLIN WITH A DOCUMENT WHICH IS TO  
BE CIRCULATED OFFICIALLY IN THE UN. TO CREATE THIS  
PRECEDENT ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT QUESTION MIGHT GIVE THE  
SOVIETS A PRETEXT FOR DEMANDING SIMILAR ATTACHMENTS TO  
THE DOCUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH ALL FRG- UN AGREEMENTS  
WHICH ARE EXTENDED TO BERLIN. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE,  
WE WOULD PREFER KEEPING THE CONSULTATION PROCESS AS  
INFORMAL AND AS ROUTINE AS POSSIBLE AND WOULD NOT BE  
IN FAVOR OF INCLUDING THE BKC/ L IN THE OFFICIAL UN  
DOCUMENTATION.  
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9. DEPARTMENT' S AND USBER' S VIEWS REQUESTED.  
HILLENBRAND

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL

## Message Attributes

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**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:**  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 11 APR 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
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**Executive Order:** RR  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**TAGS:** PFOR, PGOV, GE, GW, UN, UR  
**To:** BERLIN  
EUR  
LONDON  
MOSCOW  
NATO BRUSSELS  
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USUN NEW YORK

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